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AI enfeeblement, idle supervisors and the Peter principle in agents

This report starts from the position of a solo developer supervising a fleet of coding agents, and asks four related questions. Does a model trained to lean on a tool lose the ability to do the task without it, the way people are said to lose skills to automation? What does the dark room problem from predictive processing say about an agent whose job has been taken over by a stronger helper: does it go quiet or find something else to do? What does a supervisor agent actually do with free inference while a stronger delegate works? And does the Peter principle, where people rise to the role they are worst at, show up when LLM agents are promoted through a hierarchy?

Contents

1. Summary

All four questions sit on real, unmeasured gaps. No one has tracked a model's unaided skill while training it to use a tool, watched what a supervisor does with free inference while a stronger delegate works, applied the dark room framework to AI delegation, or tested the Peter principle with LLM agents. Adjacent evidence is strong enough to make predictions, and most of the experiments are cheap.

Recommended start. X1, a tool-off audit of released tool-RL checkpoints, is an inference-only result in about a day on a single 24 GB consumer GPU. X4, the idle supervisor tick loop, is the most novel experiment and can reuse an existing agent-sociology experiment harness nearly as is.

Next section: https://ai.hiina.space/reports/ai-enfeeblement-and-the-peter-principle/02-ai-enfeeblement-as-measured.md


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